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THE UNITED KINGDOM - FRANCE
CONTINENTAL SHELF ARBITRATION
J.G. MERRILLS*
On July 10, 1975, France and the United Kingdom, having
failed to agree on the boundaries of their continental shelf in the
English Channel and eastern Atlantic, referred the matter to arbi-
tration. By the terms of the Arbitration Agreement,' a specially ap-
pointed Court of Arbitration, composed of five distinguished
international lawyers,2 was asked to determine the disputed bound-
ary "in accordance with the rules of international law applicable in
the matter as between the Parties '' 3 and to indicate its course on a
chart.4 After receiving the Parties' written submissions, the Court
held hearings, appointed its own hydrographic expert, and pursued
clarification of a number of points of detail. In June 1977, the
Court delivered its Judgment; following a request by the United
Kingdom for the clarification of certain issues, the Court delivered
a second Judgment (Interpretation) in March 1978.1
The 1977 Judgment is a significant contribution to the contem-
porary law of the sea and has considerable implications for a wide
variety of current disputes concerning continental shelf delimita-
tion. The 1978 Interpretation though less important, provides some
useful insights into the Court's original reasoning and raises the no-
toriously difficult issue of the scope of an international tribunal's
power to interpret its own decision.
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Sheffield University.
I am indebted to my colleagues Ann MacDonald and Clare Campbell for their com-
ments on an early draft of this article.
1. [1975] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 137 (Cmd. 6280) [hereinafter cited as Arbitration Agree-
ment]. The Arbitration Agreement is set forth at the beginning of the Court of Arbitration's
decision.
2. The Arbitration Court consisted of Erik Castren, President, Herbert Briggs, Endre
Ustor, Sir Humphrey Waldock and Paul Reuter, who was forced to resign for reasons of
health and was replaced by M. Andr6 Gros. Lucius Caflisch was appointed Registrar and
Georges Malinverni was appointed Deputy-Registrar.
3. Arbitration Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2(i).
4. Id art. 9(l).
5. The texts of both the 1977 Award [hereinafter cited as Judgment] and the 1978
Decision [hereinafter cited as Interpretation] can be found in Court of Arbitration, Decisions
of 30 June 1977 and 14 March 1978 on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, [1978]
Misc. No. 15 (Cmnd. 7438).
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This article will examine both the 1977 Judgment and the 1978
Interpretation and will discuss the major implications for future
continental shelf delimitation.
I. THE DISPUTED AREA
The area in dispute consisted of the continental shelf between
the 1,000-meter isobath in the eastern Atlantic and a line thirty
minutes west of the Greenwich Meridian6 in the English Channel.'
For the purposes of the case the area can be divided into three dis-
tinct regions.
In the eastern part of the disputed area lie the Channel Islands
Archipelago, four groups of islands situated off the French coast.
The islands are internally self-governing, but are treated as part of
the United Kingdom for purposes of defense and foreign relations.
Located close to the French coast, the islands' effect on the delimi-
tation of the continental shelf was a matter of profound disagree-
ment. Strict application of the equidistance or median line
principle would have reduced the French continental shelf in the
region to a narrow coastal strip. While the United Kingdom sup-
ported this solution,8 France argued that it exaggerated the legal
significance of the archipelago and that the boundary should be the
median line in the Channel itself, with the islands restricted to an
enclave of continental shelf within the French zone.9
On either side of the Channel Islands region, where the coasts
of the two States face each other across the English Channel, the
absence of any equivalent complications had enabled the Parties to
agree in principle upon a median line delimitation. However, de-
tails of the delimitation remained to be settled and the legal signifi-
cance of two minor geographical features continued to be a matter
of dispute. Off the English coast lies the Eddystone Rock,' 0 which
the United Kingdom maintained was an island and a permissible
base-point for establishing the median line. " Further south, a geo-
logical fault in the sea bed, known as the Hurd Deep,' 2 runs for
6. The Parties had agreed that east of a line 30 minutes west of the Greenwich Merid-
ian the boundary should be the median line in the English Channel.
7. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 1, para. 1.
8. Id at 15, para. 5.
9. Id at I1, para. 7.
10. See Map, supra, at 316.
1I. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 22-23, para. 4.
12. See Map, supra, at 316.
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some eighty nautical miles in a southwesterly direction. The
United Kingdom regarded the Hurd Deep as a feature of possible
legal significance in the delimitation of the region. 13
West of the Channel entrance lies the third area, the Atlantic
region. The most significant geographical feature in this region is
the Scilly Isles, 14 lying twenty-one nautical miles off the United
Kingdom mainland and extending almost one degree further west
than the island of Ushant, the most westerly part of France. In this
region, the equidistance or median line ran in a southwesterly di-
rection, and according to the French submission, resulted in a de-
limitation unduly favorable to the United Kingdom. A number of
geological faults, which the United Kingdom regarded as an exten-
sion of the Hurd Deep, and the presence of the Republic of Ireland,
whose continental shelf boundary with the United Kingdom was
undetermined, were additional features of possible relevance in the
Atlantic region.
II. JURISDICTION
The United Kingdom asserted that part of the disputed bound-
ary lay between the Channel Islands and the coasts of Normandy
and Brittany.' 5 In that area, however, most of the waters were
claimed by the Parties either as territorial sea or as an exclusive
fishing zone. In addition, the Parties disagreed on the base-points
from which their continental shelf boundaries should be calculated.
When asked by the Court for their views on how these factors
might affect the Court's jurisdiction, the Parties replied differently.
France maintained that the Court was entitled only to delimit the
continental shelf and that delimitation within the territorial sea had
not been authorized.'6 The United Kingdom, though willing to in-
terpret the Court's mandate more broadly than France, declared
that it could regard the Court as having jurisdiction to delimit the
area around the British islands of Ecrehos and Minquiers 17 only if
13. Judgment, supra note 5, at 25, para. 12.
14. See Map, supra, at 316.
15. Judgment, supra note 5, at 27, para. 18.
16. Id at 27, paras. 17, 20.
17. The Islands consist of two groups of rocks and islets situated between Jersey and the
French coast. In the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [19531 I.C.J. 47, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) awarded the Islands to the United Kingdom. Fishing rights around the
Islands were dealt with in a separate Anglo-French agreement ratified simultaneously with
the special agreement to refer the question of sovereignty to the Court. See Johnson, The
Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 3 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 189 (1954).
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the Court did so on the basis of the British view of the islands'
territorial sea.'8
Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine the boundary between the Channel
Islands and the French coast. '9 The Court's jurisdiction was based
upon the Parties' consent, which was manifestly absent. Further-
more, practical considerations favored the settlement of this part of
the boundary dispute by negotiation, because
[i]n narrow waters such as these, strewn with islets and rocks,
coastal States have a certain liberty in their choice of base-points;
and the selection of base-points for arriving at a median line in
such waters which is at once practical and equitable appears to
be a matter peculiarly suitable for determination by direct nego-
tiations between the Parties.2"
Another preliminary question concerned the Republic of
Ireland. Ireland, though not a party to the case, had claims in the
northern part of the Atlantic region, which had been referred to in
the pleadings and in the Parties' earlier negotiations. 2' Moreover,
the United Kingdom had sought to draw a parallel between the
effect of French and Irish claims on the British continental shelf
and the position of the Federal Republic of Germany in the North
Sea Continental Shelf (North Sea) Cases.2 2
While it referred to these considerations in a later part of its
Judgment,23 the Court ruled that its decision bound only the Par-
ties, that it had no jurisdiction to discuss Irish claims, and that no
inferences should be drawn from its Judgment with respect to the
United Kingdom-Republic of Ireland boundary. 24 The Court
stated that its determination of the British-French continental
shelf boundary in the Atlantic region did not depend on calcula-
tions of proportionality, to which Irish claims might be relevant.
The Court confined its speculations to the comment that
[iun so far as there may be a possibility that the two successive
delimitations of continental shelf zones in this region, where the
three States are neighbours abutting on the same continental
shelf, may result in some overlapping of the zones, it is mani-
18. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 27, paras. 18, 20.
19. Id at 28, para. 20.
20. Id at 29, para. 22.
21. Id at 29, para. 24.
22. Id. at 29, para. 24; see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3.
23. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 11, para. 236.
24. Id. at 31, paras. 27, 28.
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festly outside the competence of this Court to decide in advance
and hypothetically the legal problem which may then arise.
That problem would normally find its appropriate solution by
negotiations directly between the three States concerned, negoti-
ations which may indeed be called for by the prolongation of
their maritime zones beyond the 1,000-metre isobath to 200 nau-
tical miles.2 5
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A. The Geneva Convention on the Continental She~f
26
After dealing with the preliminary matters described above,
the Court addressed the fundamental issue in the case - the law
applicable to the delimitation. On this complex question the views
of the Parties were diametrically opposed. The United Kingdom
contended that the matter was governed by the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, specifically by Article 6:
1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territo-
ries of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each
other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to
such States shall be determined by agreement between them.
In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary
line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the
median line, every point of which is equidistant from the
nearest points of the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each State is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territo-
ries of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental
shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In
the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line
is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be
determined by application of the principle of equidistance
from the nearest points of the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.27
France asserted that the Convention was irrelevant and that
the dispute was governed exclusively by customary international
law.28 The French averred that it was the Court's duty to apply the
principles of "equitable delimitation" as defined by the Interna-
25. Id at 3 1, para. 28.
26. Done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311
[hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf Convention].
27. Id art. 6.
28. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 35, paras. 35, 36.
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tional Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Cases.29
The Court, in deciding the applicable law, first had to consider
whether the Geneva Convention had entered into force between
France and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom ratified
the Convention in 1964.30 France acceded to the Convention the
following year,3' but appended to her instrument of accession a
declaration which included a three-part reservation to Article 6.32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations notified the United
Kingdom of the French accession and declaration. The United
Kingdom responded that "[tlhe Government of the United
Kingdom [was] unable to accept the reservations made by the Gov-
ernment of the French Republic."33 The Court had to determine
whether the United Kingdom response to France's reservations
prevented the Convention from coming into force between the two
Parties.
The Court noted that although the law regarding reservations
to multilateral treaties was in the course of evolution at the critical
time, the evolving areas were primarily concerned with cases in
which a multilateral treaty contained no express provision relating
to reservations.34 Article 12 of the Geneva Convention35 specifi-
cally addressed the question of reservations; consequently the tran-
sitional character of this part of the law of treaties was not
important to the present case.
Article 12 permits reservations to the Convention with the ex-
ception of Articles 1 through 3 inclusive.36 In the Court's view, the
effect of this provision was to prevent States from contesting a
State's right to be a party to the Convention on the basis of reserva-
tions authorized by the Article.37 On the other hand, Article 12,
though quite general in its terms, could not be interpreted as requir-
ing a State to accept every reservation which fell within its terms.
That would "amount almost to a license to contracting States to
29. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 23.
30. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 32, para. 31. The English text appears in MULTILAT-
ERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY
FUNCTIONS 538-39 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
31. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 32, para. 33; MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note
30, at 538.
32. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 540.
33. Id. at 542.
34. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 36, para. 38.
35. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 26, art. 12.
36. Id.
37. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 36, para. 39.
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write their own treaty and would manifestly go beyond the pur-
poses of the Article."38 The Court's view was that Article 12 left
contracting States free to react in any way they think fit to a
reservation made in conformity with its provisions, including re-
fusal to accept the reservation. Whether any such reaction
amounts to a mere comment, a mere reserving of position, a re-
jection merely of the particular reservation or a wholesale rejec-
tion of any mutual relations with the reserving State under the
treaty consequently depends on the intention of the State con-
cerned.39
France argued that the British refusal to accept its reservations
to Articles 6, and 5(1) amounted to an "objection" to these reserva-
tions and was intended to prevent the Convention from coming
into force between the two States.' The United Kingdom denied
the French allegations and argued that its acceptance of and obser-
vations on other French reservations were clear evidence that treaty
relations under the Convention were contemplated.4' The British
maintained that their comments on France's reservations were not
formal objections, but were merely a way of counteracting any pre-
sumption that those reservations had been accepted, pending reso-
lution of the complex problem of their admissibility and
interpretation.42
The Court upheld the British submission on this point after
emphasizing that the British comments must be read in light of the
express authorization of reservations in Article 12 and supported its
conclusion with a reference to the state practice of other Parties to
the Convention.43 Without prejudice to the separate question of
the specific status of Article 6, the Court decided that the British
response to the French reservations had not prevented the Conven-
tion from coming into force between the two States. 44
The French then argued that regardless of the question of res-
ervations, recent developments in customary international law ren-
dered the Continental Shelf Convention and the three other
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea45 obsolete; therefore,
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 36-37, para. 40.
41. Id at 37, para. 41.
42. Id at 38, para. 43.
43. Id at 38, para. 44.
44. Id at 40, para. 48.
45. Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
8
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the obligations of the Parties to these treaties were governed solely
by customary international law.46 The French argument relied
upon the emergence, at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), of a consensus on the issue of
the 200-mile exclusive economic zone,4 7 the adoption of the concept
in the Revised Single Negotiating Text48 and its increasing support
in state practice.
Despite these dramatic developments, the Court rejected the
French argument that the Convention had been superseded. The
Court listed a number of British objections to the French thesis and
stated that under Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, its task
was to decide the course of the boundary "in accordance with the
rules of international law applicable in the matter between the Par-
ties."49 While acknowledging that developments in customary in-
ternational law could modify or even extinguish treaty rights and
obligations, the Court explained that the Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf was a recent treaty which only the most conclusive evi-
dence of the Parties' intentions could overturni ° The absence of
any such evidence, together with significant counter-indications,
convinced the Court that the French argument must be rejected.
After establishing that the Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf was in force between the Parties, the Court directed its
attention to a more difficult question, the scope and effect of the
Convention's Article 6. The United Kingdom boldly contended
that the French reservations to the Article should be totally disre-
garded.
France's first reservation to Article 6 stated: "[I1n the absence
5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done April
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial
Sea Convention]; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
46. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 39, para. 45.
47. On the concept of the exclusive economic zone, see generall, Fleischer, The Right to
a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548 (1977); Kanenas, Wide
Limits and 'Equitable" Distribution of Seabed Resources, I OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 137
(1973); Nelson, The Patrimonial Sea, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 668 (1973); Phillips, The Exclu-
sive Economic Zone as a Concept in International Law, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 585 (1977).
48. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 8/Rev. l/pts. I, II & III, V OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 125 (1976). Informal
Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Rev. i (1979),
reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 686 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev. 1].
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of a specific agreement the Government of the French Republic
will not accept that any boundary of the Continental Shelf deter-
mined by application of the principle of equidistance shall be in-
voked against it if such boundary is calculated from baselines
established after 29 April 1958.'51 The United Kingdom argued
that this could not be regarded as a proper reservation to Article 6,
because the baselines in question were not defined.5 2 For a defini-
tion of baselines, it was necessary to refer to Articles 3 and 4 of the
1958 Territorial Sea Convention,5 3 or in the case of France, which
was not a party to that Convention, to the rules of customary inter-
national law. In rejecting the British argument, the Court held that
on its natural meaning the French reservation related only to the
issue of continental shelf delimitation.54 It was not, as the United
Kingdom had argued, a reservation to the general rules of interna-
tional law concerning straight baselines, and consequently must be
regarded as a true reservation to Article 6."
The second French reservation to Article 6 declared that in the
absence of a specific agreement, France would not accept that any
continental shelf boundary determined on the equidistance princi-
ple could be invoked against it "if it extends beyond the 200 metre
isobath.' 56 The British insisted that although the reservation was
attached to Article 6, it was in substance a reservation to Article 1.57
The United Kingdom explained that France had always opposed
the idea of an unlimited seaward extension of the continental shelf
and had affirmed this position in an interpretative declaration to
Article 1.58 The British then argued that France's reservation had
been included to support that policy by discouraging claims beyond
the 200-meter isobath and must therefore be regarded as a reserva-
51. Id. at 41, para. 50.
52. Id
53. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 45, arts. 3-4.
54. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 41, paras. 50-51.
55. Id at 41, para. 51.
56. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 540.
57. For the purpose of these Articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as refer-
ring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natu-
ral resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.
Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 26, art. 1.
58. In the view of the French government the expression "adjacent areas" implies a
notion of geophysical, geological, and geographical dependence which ipsofacto rules out an
unlimited extension of the continental shelf. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra 30, at 540.
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tion to Article 1 and a contravention of Article 12.19
The Court disagreed with the British contention. The Court
explained that the reservation must be construed in accordance
with the natural meaning of its terms; the motives of the French
government in formulating the reservation were irrelevant.6" The
Court held that the reservation only applied to the use of the equi-
distance principle to effect a delimitation under Article 6.61 There-
fore, the reservation could not be regarded as incompatible with
Article 12.
The third French reservation to Article 6 proclaimed that in
the absence of a specific agreement, France would not accept that
any continental shelf boundary determined on the equidistance
principle could be invoked against it
if it lies in areas where, in the Government's opinion there are
"special circumstances" within the meaning of Article 6,
paragraphs 1 and 2, that is to say: the Bay of Biscay, the Bay of
Granville, and the sea areas of the Straits of Dover and of the
North Sea off the French coast.
62
The British challenge to this reservation adopted a different
line of attack. The United Kingdom sought to demonstrate that it
was not a true reservation at all, but a mere interpretative declara-
tion. The British argued that this "reservation" was no more than a
notification by the French government of the areas where it consid-
ered special circumstances to exist for the purposes of Article 6.63 It
was, therefore, an application or an invocation of that Article, and
not a reservation.
The British argument was rejected. The Court pointed out
that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 64 defined the
term "reservation" to cover both attempts to exclude or modify the
terms of a treaty and attempts "to exclude or modify the legal effect
of certain provisions in their application to the reserving State."65
The Court held that the reservation imposed a specific condition on
the French acceptance of the delimitation regime of Article 6,
59. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 42, para. 52.
60. Id. at 42, para. 53.
61. Id
62. Id. at 42, para. 54.
63. Id.
64. Openedfor Signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprintedin 63 AM.
J. INT'L L. 875 (1969); 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Conven-
tion].
65. Judgment, supra note 5, at 43, para. 55.
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which made "the application of that regime dependent on accept-
ance by the other State of the French Republic's designation of the
named areas as involving 'special circumstances' regardless of the
validity or otherwise of that designation under Article 6.66
Since the British attempt to reject the French reservations in
limine was disallowed, the Court then addressed the effect of the
reservations, and the British response to them, upon the status of
Article 6. France argued that the reservations imposed conditions
on its consent to be bound, and that when the reservations were
rejected by the United Kingdom, the Parties' lack of agreement on
the scope of Article 6 meant that to resolve issues of delimitation
their obligations must be determined by customary international
law.67 The Court rejected this argument and held that since the
British rejection of the reservations was directed only toward the
reservations, and not the entire Article, the effect of the United
Kingdom's action was limited to the reservations.68
The Court next considered the effect of the United Kingdom's
rejection of the French reservations. The United Kingdom argued
that because the French reservations had been rejected, the Parties'
legal relations were governed by Article 6 and were unmodified by
the conditions France had sought to introduce. 69 This argument
was also rejected. Such an approach, said the Court, would allow
the British rejection unilaterally to set aside express conditions
placed by the French Republic on its consent to be bound by the
Article and could not easily be reconciled with the principle of mu-
tuality of consent in the law of treaties.7"
Having rejected the main contentions of both sides, the Court
accepted an alternative British argument and expressed its conclu-
sion on the question of the combined effect of the French reserva-
tions and the British rejection of the reservations in the following
important passage:
[T]he effect of the rejection may properly, in the view of the
66. Id (emphasis added). Bowett has expressed doubts regarding the correctness of the
Court's conclusion on this point. See Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral
Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67, 91 n.1 (1976-1977). However, the Court's reasoning has
been persuasively defended. See McRae, Delimitation of the Continental Shef Between the
United Kingdom and France- The Channel Arbitration, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 173, 178
(1977).
67. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 44, para. 57.
68. Id. at 44, para. 59.
69. Id. at 44, para. 58.
70. Id. at 45, para. 60.
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Court, be said to render the reservations non-opposable to the
United Kingdom. Just as the effect of the French reservations is
to prevent the United Kingdom from invoking the provisions of
Article 6 except on the basis of the conditions stated in the reser-
vations, so the effect of their rejection is to prevent the French
Republic from imposing the reservations on the United
Kingdom for the purpose of invoking against it as binding a de-
limitation made on the basis of the conditions contained in the
reservations. Thus, the combined effect of the French reserva-
tions and their rejection by the United Kingdom is neither to
render Article 6 inapplicable in toto, as the French Republic con-
tends, nor to render it applicable in toto, as the United Kingdom
primarily contends. It is to render the Article inapplicable as be-
tween the two countries to the extent, but only to the extent, of
the reservations; and this is precisely the effect envisaged in such
cases by Article 21, paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and the effect indicated by the principle of
mutuality of consent.7
The Court concluded that Article 6 was inapplicable only to
the extent of the French reservations; it was then necessary to deter-
mine what their extent was. On this issue the Court was presented
with an ingenious British argument, designed to preserve the integ-
rity of Article 6. The United Kingdom indicated that the three
French reservations were expressly stated to apply in the absence of
a specific agreement to the contrary and argued that the reserva-
tions' purpose was to render a unilateral delimitation by another
State non-opposable to France.7 2 Because delimitation was now
the subject of arbitration, the British maintained that there could be
no question of a unilateral delimitation; therefore, the Court was
free to determine the disputed boundary without reference to the
reservations.
7 3
The Court briefly acknowledged the British argument, but
held that such a construction of the reservations was quite untena-
ble. The Court observed that
what the reservations are directed to prevent is that an equidis-
tance delimitation, which runs counter to one of the three condi-
tions, should be invoked against the French Republic without its
specific agreement. The Court is therefore unable to see on what
basis the reservations can be considered to have lost their object
71. Id at 45, para. 61.
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upon the submission of the delimitation to arbitration, the very
time at which they would be expected to have their maximum
relevance for the reserving State.74
Support for this conclusion was found in an important considera-
tion of legal policy.
[It is hard to imagine a more serious impediment to recourse to
arbitration and judicial settlement than if it were to be supposed
that, by the very act of accepting arbitration or judicial settle-
ment, a State might lose the benefit of a reservation which it had
specifically formulated for its legal protection in regard to the
matter in issue in the proceedings.75
The Court next addressed the impact of the three French reser-
vations to Article 6. The first reservation, relating to straight base-
lines, was found to have no bearing on the question before the
Court, because this method of delimitation was not in use in the
arbitration area.76
The second French reservation, which was directed against a
boundary determined by application of the equidistance principle
"if it extends beyond the 200-metre isobath," was also found to
have no application. In the negotiations preceding the arbitration,
"it was the French Republic itself which proposed that the delimi-
tation of its boundary with the United Kingdom should be pro-
longed beyond the 200-metre to the 1,000-metre isobath. ' 77 Under
these circumstances, the Court held that whatever the intention be-
hind the reservation, the above circumstances excluded its applica-
tion to the present dispute.78
The third French reservation was much more important. At
issue was the meaning of the reservation's expression "Bay of
Granville." The United Kingdom argued that the reservation cov-
ered only the sea areas to the east and south of Jersey.79 The Court,
however, agreed with the French contention that in light of the Par-
ties' earlier negotiations, the expression must be given its broader
74. Id at 46, para. 64.
75. Id
76. The United Kingdom did not rely on straight baselines. The French claim to use a
straight baseline across the Anse de Vauville on the coast of Normandy was disputed by the
United Kingdom, but the disputed baseline lay within the part of the Channel Islands region
which the Court had earlier held to be outside its jurisdiction. See Judgment, supra note 5,
at 49, para. 71.
77. Id at 49, paras. 72-73.
78. Id at 49-50, para. 73. For criticism of the Court's conclusion, see McRae, supra
note 66, at 179-80.
79. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 50, para. 74.
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connotation and be interpreted to cover the entire Channel Islands
region.80
The result of the extensive argument on the applicable law for
the arbitration was a decision from which both sides could derive
some satisfaction. By virtue of the Bay of Granville reservation,
delimitation in the Channel Islands region would follow customary
international law, as France desired. In the Atlantic region and in
the English Channel, however, the British view of the Geneva Con-
vention was accepted and in these areas delimitation would be
based on Article 6.81
B. The Geneva Convention and Customary International Law.-
The Coextensive Nature of Article 6 and North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases Principles
Major attention was devoted to the question of whether the
delimitation was governed by the Geneva Convention or by cus-
tomary international law, because the Parties assumed that the two
would lead to different results. In what must be regarded as the
most significant part of its Judgment, the Court challenged this
premise and sought to demonstrate that for practical purposes the
provisions of Article 6 and the principles laid down in the North
Sea Cases could be regarded as coextensive.
The key to the Court's reasoning was its explanation of the
relationship between the equidistance principle and the concept of
special circumstances. In the Court's view, Article 6 provided that
in the absence of agreement a combined equidistance - special
circumstances rule governed the delimitation.82 Contrary to the
British argument, "special circumstances" were not a qualification
of the equidistance principle requiring proof but "an integral part
of the rule providing for application of the equidistance principle.
As such, although involving matters of fact, that question is always
80. Id.
81. In a short declaration appended to the Judgment, one member of the Court ex-
amined the status of Article 6 in more detail. While expressing his agreement with the deci-
sion as a whole, Judge Briggs indicated his support for a number of arguments which the
Court had rejected. Holding that the French reservations were, as the United Kingdom had
maintained, intended only to prevent a unilateral delimitation by a neighboring State, he
decided that they had no relevance in the present case. Moreover, even if that construction
were wrong, Judge Briggs agreed with the British argument that the first and second reserva-
tions to Article 6 were invalid and that the Granville Bay provision was not a reservation but
an interpretative declaration. See id. at 120-26 (Briggs, J., separate opinion).
82. Id at 49, para. 70.
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one of law of which, in case of submission to arbitration, the tribu-
nal must itself, proprio motu, take cognizance when applying Arti-
cle 6."' 3
The United Kingdom conceded that a State could invoke "spe-
cial circumstances" without having made a reservation to that effect
when ratifying or acceding to the Convention. 4 This, said the
Court, "further underlines the full liberty of the Court in appreciat-
ing the geographical or other circumstances relevant to the determi-
nation of the continental shelf boundary, and at the same time
reduces the possibility of any difference in the appreciation of these
circumstances under Article 6 and customary law."85
In a crucial passage, the Court asserted that the reference to
special circumstances had been included in Article 6 to ensure that
its application would produce an equitable delimitation:
[Tihe travauxpriyparatoires of Article 6, in the International Law
Commission and at the Geneva Conference of 1958, show that
this condition was introduced into paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Ar-
ticle because it was recognised that, owing to particular geo-
graphical features or configurations, application of the
equidistance principle might not infrequently result in an unrea-
sonable or inequitable delimitation of the continental shelf. In
short, the role of the "special circumstances" condition in Article 6
is to ensure an equitable delimitation; and the combined "equidis-
tance - special circumstances rule," in effect gives particular ex-
pression to a general norm that, failing agreement, the boundary
between States abutting on the same continental shelf is to be
determined on equitable principles.
86
This conclusion was reinforced by the absence of any defini-
tion of "special circumstances" in Article 6. This the Court re-
garded as further evidence that equidistance was in no sense an
independent method of delimitation, but a way in which an equita-
ble delimitation might in some instances be achieved.
Article 6 neither defines "special circumstances" nor lays down
83. Id at 48, para. 68. In his separate declaration, however, Judge Briggs expressed his
concern that
the Court's interpretation of Article 6 seems, in effect, to shift "the burden of proof'
of "special circumstances" from the State which invokes them to the Court itself,
and constitutes some threat that the rule of positive law expressed in Article 6 will
be evaded by its identification with subjective equitable principles, permitting at-
tempts by the Court to redress the inequities of geography.
Id at 126 (Briggs, J., separate opinion).
84. d. at 48, para. 69.
85. Id at 48, para. 69.
86. Id at 48, para. 70 (emphasis added).
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the criterion by which it is to be assessed whether any given cir-
cumstances justify a boundary line other than the equidistance
line. Consequently, even under Article 6 the question whether
the use of the equidistance principle or some other method is
appropriate for achieving an equitable delimitation is very much
a matter of appreciation in the light of the geographical and
other circumstances. In other words, even under Article 6 it is the
geographical and other circumstances of any given case which indi-
cate andjustify the use of the equidistance method as the means of
achieving an equitable solution rather than the inherent quality of
the method as a legal norm of delimitation.87
Having held that "the rules of customary law are a relevant
and even essential means both for interpreting and completing the
provisions of Article 6,''88 the Court next considered the scope and
significance of the judgment in the North Sea Cases.
The Parties agreed that the ICJ had rejected the view that de-
limitation involved the apportionment of just and equitable shares
of an undivided whole. 89 Thus, the task of the Court of Arbitration
was to fix a boundary, not to allocate a common resource. The
Parties also agreed that the ICJ's conception of the continental shelf
as the "natural prolongation" of the land territory of a State was
fundamental to the present case.9° The Parties differed, however,
on the weight to be attached to "proximity," that is, the closeness of
the disputed continental shelf to the land territory of the claimant
States. France, whose claim was for a boundary more favorable
than that conferred by the equidistance principle, argued that the
ICJ had rejected proximity in favour of "continuity" - the idea
that the continental shelf was simply a seaward projection of land
territory.9 The United Kingdom, while recognizing the Court's re-
fusal to regard proximity as an absolute criterion, argued that it had
not been wholly rejected as a possible method of delimitation.92
The Court of Arbitration supported the British view on this point.
Although acknowledging that proximity had been rejected as a ba-
sis of title, the Court held that the North Sea Cases explicitly en-
dorsed its legitimacy as a means of delimitation in appropriate
87. Id (emphasis added)
88. Id at 50, para. 75.
89. Id. at 51, para. 78.
90. Id at 52, para. 79.
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conditions.93
The Court found its conclusion further supported by the ICJ's
treatment of the equidistance principle in the North Sea Cases.
France and the United Kingdom drew very different conclusions
from the extensive discussion of this principle in the North Sea
Cases. By emphasizing the ICJ's statement that "there is no legal
limit to the considerations which States may take account of for the
purpose of making sure that they apply equitable procedures," 94
France attempted to minimize the significance of equidistance as a
criterion of delimitation.95 By maintaining that the North Sea
Cases Judgment was there only concerned with the factors to be
taken into account by the Parties in negotiating an equitable delim-
itation, the United Kingdom sought to demonstrate that the im-
portance of equidistance in other contexts had been in no way
diminished.96
The Court of Arbitration adopted an intermediate position.
The Court held that in the North Sea Cases, the equidistance prin-
ciple had been neither approved nor discarded.97 The Court stated
that the North Sea Cases decision had been intended to indicate
that
the validity of the equidistance method, or of any other method,
as a means of achieving an equitable delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf is always relative to the particular geographical situ-
ation. In short, whether under customary law or under Article 6,
it is never a question either of complete or of no freedom of
choice as to method; for the appropriateness - the equitable
character - of the method is always a function of the particular
geographical situation.98
Although the ICJ had rejected the argument that the equidis-
tance principle was required by customary law, it had recognized
its convenience and general suitability.99 This sentiment the Court
of Arbitration endorsed, adding that the usefulness of the equidis-
tance principle had been demonstrated by recent state practice."
After acknowledging that the equidistance principle occupied
93. Id. at 53, para. 81.
94. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 50.
95. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 53, para. 83.
96. Id.
97. Id at 54, para. 84.
98. Id
99. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 24.
100. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 54, para. 85.
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a special place in the methodology of continental shelf delimitation,
the Court added an important qualification based on the distinction
the ICJ had made between "opposite" and "adjacent" States.
Denmark, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany
are, for the purposes of the Geneva Convention and customary in-
ternational law, adjacent States. The ICJ mentioned that applica-
tion of the equidistance method to such a situation was far more
likely to produce an inequitable result than in the case of opposite
States.10 While in the case of adjacent States the effect of any ir-
regularity in the coastline was automatically magnified, use of the
median line between opposite States was a very good way of ensur-
ing that each State was assigned the natural prolongation of its ter-
ritory.
Both France and the United Kingdom recognized the signifi-
cance of the distinction between opposite and adjacent States, and
the Court focused its attention on the characterization of the dis-
puted area. The English Channel region was not in dispute; the
Parties agreed the situation was one of opposite States. 0 2 In the
Channel Islands region, though the legal significance of the Islands
was in dispute, the Parties agreed in principle that the situation was
again one of opposite .States. 0 3 In the Atlantic region, however, the
Parties disagreed."o
France argued that even if the Geneva Convention was in
force between the Parties, the situation fell outside Article 6(1), 'O
because in the area in question there were no coasts "between"
which the continental shelf could be said to be situated. 0 6 Conse-
quently, because the French text of the Convention referred to "la
dlimitation du plateau continental entre ces l tats," 7 the situation
could not be said to be one of opposite States. Because France and
the United Kingdom had no common land frontier, France con-
ceded that they could not be regarded as adjacent States within Ar-
ticle 6(2), but attempted to persuade the Court that there was here a
sufficient analogy with the situation of adjacent States to lend rele-
101. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 37.
102. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 55-56, para. 87.
103. Id
104. Id at 56, para. 88.
105. Id at 56, para. 89.
106. Id
107. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 26, art. 6(1) (French text) (emphasis ad-
ded). The English text reads: "[T]he boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such
states .... " Id. (emphasis added).
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vance to the ICJ's comments on the unsuitability of the equidis-
tance method. 0 8
The British asserted that Article 6 was clearly intended to be
exhaustive;' °9 that the situation was certainly not one of adjacent
States within Article 6(2);' 1 and that although in the Atlantic re-
gion the continental shelf lay "off" rather than "between" the two
coasts, there was no reason to regard this area as a separate sector,
requiring a different method of delimitation from the rest of the
English Channel."'
The Court of Arbitration upheld the British argument that Ar-
ticle 6 was intended to be exhaustive and found support for their
decision in the North Sea Cases. 12 The characterization of the sit-
uation in the Atlantic region as one of opposite or adjacent States
was, however, an issue to which the Court refused to attach impor-
tance. Although inclined to regard the situation as one of opposite
States, the Court stressed that it was the geographical and not the
legal relationship of the Parties that was the all-important consider-
ation. "3 The aim of both sections of Article 6 was to achieve an
equitable delimitation and this depended on geography, not on
which section of the Article applied. Therefore, while generally the
equidistance method would achieve an equitable delimitation be-
tween opposite States,.where States were legally opposite, but geo-
graphically adjacent, delimitation by some other method might be
required.
The rules of delimitation prescribed in paragraph 1 and para-
graph 2 are the same, and it is the actual geographical relation of
the coasts of the ,two States which determine their application.
What is important is that, in appreciating the appropriateness of
the equidistance method as a means of effecting a "just" or "eq-
uitable" delimitation in the Atlantic region, the Court must have
regard both to the lateral relation of the two coasts as they abut
upon the continental shelf of the region and to the great distance
seawards that this shelf extends from those coasts." 1
4
The Court next addressed a general consideration arising from
the North Sea Cases, the question of "proportionality" - the idea
108. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 56-57, para. 90.
109. Id. at 57, para. 91.
110. Id.
111. Id at 58, para. 93.
112. Id at 58, para. 94.
113. Id. at 59, para. 95.
114. Id at 113, para. 242.
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that the continental shelves of neighboring States should be ap-
proximately proportional to the lengths of their respective coast-
lines.'15 France argued that the ICJ's emphasis on this principle
indicated that the Court regarded it as a principle of customary in-
ternational law.' 16 The Court of Arbitration disagreed. Acknowl-
edging that proportionality was a relevant factor in arriving at an
equitable delimitation, the Court declared that proportionality
could not be regarded as a general criterion or an independent basis
for delimitation."' Pointing out that particular configurations of
the coast or individual geographical features might sometimes pre-
vent a boundary drawn according to the equidistance principle
from reflecting the general configuration of the coast, the Court ex-
plained that
[tihe concept of "proportionality" merely expresses the criterion
or factor by which it may be determined whether such a distor-
tion results in an inequitable delimitation of the continental shelf
as between the coastal States concerned. The factor of propor-
tionality may appear in the form of the ratio between the areas
of continental shelf to the lengths of the respective coastlines, as
in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. But it may also appear,
and more usually does, as a factor for determining the reason-
able or unreasonable - the equitable or inequitable - effects of
particular geographical features or configurations upon the
course of an equidistance line boundary. In short, it is dispropor-
tion, rather than any general principle of protportionality which is
the relevant criterion or factor."
t8
The Court reinforced its conclusion on this point by repeating
that an equitable delimitation was distinct from an apportionment
of the continental shelf;' that the Court was not engaged in dis-
pensing distributive justice; 20 and that, as the ICJ had emphasized,
delimitation was not a question of completely "refashioning na-
ture," but "of remedying the disproportionality and inequitable ef-
fects produced by particular geographical configurations or features
in situations where otherwise the appurtenance of roughly compa-
rable attributions of continental shelf to each State would be indi-
cated by the geographical facts."'
2 1
115. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 91.
116. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 60, para. 98.
117. Id. at 61, para. 101.
118. Id at 60, paras. 100-01 (emphasis added).
119. Id at 60, para. 101.
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IV. DELIMITING THE ENGLISH CHANNEL
The Parties agreed that in the English Channel the legal situa-
tion was one of opposite States, and that in principle, delimitation
should follow the median line. The Court of Arbitration con-
curred, ruling that due to the geographical circumstances, use of the
median line would effect an equitable delimitation in accordance
with the requirements of Article 6(1) of the Geneva Convention.'
22
During negotiations between 1970 and 1974, the Parties had
largely succeeded in agreeing upon the course of the median line in
the areas to the east and west of the Channel Islands region and,
with the encouragement of the Court, had in the course of the pro-
ceedings succeeded in settling a number of outstanding details.
Before the Court could confirm these sections of the boundary,
however, it had to resolve two matters which the Parties had been
unable to agree upon - the United Kingdom claim to use the Ed-
dystone Rock as a base-point for establishing the median line, and
the significance of the partial break in the continental shelf, known
as the Hurd Deep and Hurd Deep Fault Zone.
The evidence indicated that the highest part of the Eddystone
Rock is only slightly above the highest full tides and may be cov-
ered by them. 123 The French insisted that if the top of the Rock
was not continuously above water, it was, under customary interna-
tional law, a mere low-tide elevation, or drying rock, and could not
be used as a base-point for establishing the median line.' 24
The United Kingdom relied on the fact that, though the Rock
may be covered by exceptional tides, it was located above the line
of mean high-water spring tides and argued that the Rock should
therefore be regarded as an island. 25 The British also argued that
whatever the legal status of the Rock, its use as a base-point had
been accepted by France during discussions on the protection of
French fishing rights and the implementation of the 1964 European
Fisheries Convention in 1964-1965, and again between 1970 and
1974 when the negotiations concerning the median line in the
Channel had taken place.1 26 France answered by challenging the
inferences on which the British argument was based and drew at-
122. Id at 61, para. 103.
123. Id at 69, para. 124.
124. Id at 69, para. 125.
125. Id at 70, para. 127.
126. Id at 71, para. 129.
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tention to a number of French statements questioning the signifi-
cance of the Rock.
The Court of Arbitration declined to decide the general ques-
tion of where islands end and low-tide elevations begin, but ac-
cepted the alternative British argument. 27 The Court concluded
that too much use had been made of the Eddystone Rock in deal-
ings between the Parties for the French argument to be sustainable
without stronger evidence of French reservations as to its signifi-
cance.
The Eddystone Rock, as is confirmed by the Court's own expert,
was treated as relevant to the delimitation of the median line in
the Channel in 1971. Consequently, the French Government's
statement, that it has never accepted "officiellement" the coordi-
nates communicated to it so far as concerns the use of Eddystone
Rock, does not seem to the Court sufficient to counterbalance the
evidence of its use in 1971 by both Parties. This evidence is,
moreover, reinforced by the French Government's earlier ac-
ceptance of the relevance of the Eddystone Rock in the delimita-
tion of the United Kingdom's fishery limits.'
z8
The Court's decision confirmed the use of the Eddystone Rock as a
base-point and resolved this section of the disputed boundary in
favor of the United Kingdom.1
29
The remaining Channel delimitation issue concerned the
British argument regarding the significance of the Hurd Deep and
Hurd Deep Fault Zone. While accepting the applicability of the
median line in the delimitation of the Channel area, the United
Kingdom argued that if for any reason that line was rejected, the
boundary should follow the line of the Hurd Deep and Hurd Deep
Fault Zone, because this marked a break in the continuity of the
continental shelf.
130
The Court concluded that the geological faults in question
could exercise no material influence on the determination of the
disputed boundary.' 3 ' It ruled that the Hurd Deep and Hurd Deep
Fault Zone did not interrupt the essential continuity of the conti-
nental shelf in the relevant area, and that by comparison with the
Norwegian Trough, which the United Kingdom did not regard as
limiting Norway's continental shelf, they must be regarded as mi-
127. ld at 74, para. 139.
128. Id at 75, para. 143.
129. Id at 75, para. 144.
130. Id at 62, para. 104.
131. Id at 63, para. 109.
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nor features. 132 The Court dismissed the British contention that the
fault was a significant geological feature which could be used to
define the continental shelf boundary if the equidistance principle
were to be rejected. 133 If equidistance had been rejected, the need
to establish an equitable delimitation, not this insignificant geologi-
cal fault, would have determined the course of the revised bound-
ary.
Should the equidistance line not appear to the Court to consti-
tute the appropriate boundary in any area, it will be because
some geographical feature amounts to a "special circumstance"
justifying another boundary under Article 6 or, by rendering the
equidistance line inequitable, calls under customary law for the
use of some other method. It follows that any alternative bound-
ary would either have to be one justified by the "special circum-
stances" or one apt to correct the inequity caused by the
particular geographical feature. But the axis of the Hurd Deep-
Hurd Deep Fault Zone is placed where it is simply as a fact of
nature, and there is no intrinsic reason why a boundary along
that axis should be the boundary which is justified by the special
circumstance under Article 6 or which, under customary law, is
needed to remedy the particular inequity.' 
34
V. DELIMITING THE CHANNEL ISLANDS REGION
The Parties agreed that in the Channel Islands region 35 the
legal situation was one of opposite States and that the delimitation
of the continental shelf should employ the median line. 36 Where
they differed was on the question of how that line should be drawn.
The United Kingdom argued that because islands are legally enti-
tled to their own continental shelf, the median line in the English
Channel should loop to the south and east and pass between the
Channel Islands and the French coast. 13' France, arguing that the
special geographical circumstances required a different solution,
maintained that throughout its length the median line should be
drawn between the mainland of the United Kingdom and the
French coast and that the Channel Islands should be accommo-
dated by the creation of a six-mile enclave within the area of conti-
132. Id at 63, para. 107.
133. Id at 63, para. 108.
134. Id
135. Id. at 76, para. 146.
136. Id
137. Id at 79, para. 154.
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nental shelf assigned to France. 13
The Court, as discussed above, held that delimitation of the
area between the Channel Islands and the French coast was beyond
its competence and that in the remaining Channel Islands area, the
issue was governed by customary international law. 139 Therefore,
the Court's task was to determine the legal significance of the
Channel Islands in light of the principles of equitable delimitation
as defined by the North Sea Cases.
France asserted that geographically, geologically, and legally
the area to the south of the mid-Channel median line was part of
the French continental shelf.14° While it was conceded that islands
generally are entitled to a continental shelf of their own, France
argued that in the special situation in the Channel, an unmodified
application of the equidistance principle would produce a dispro-
portionate division of the continental shelf, detrimental to French
navigational, security, and defense interests. In the French view
this inequitable result could be avoided only by ignoring the
Channel Islands and using the mid-Channel median line,' 4 ' a re-
sult in conformity with both Anglo-French practice and state prac-
tice generally and one that is further supported by the emphasis in
the North Sea Cases on the principles of natural prolongation and
proportionality. 1
42
The starting point of the United Kingdom argument was that
under Article 1 of the Geneva Convention and in customary inter-
national law, islands are entitled to their own continental shelf.'43
The British viewed exceptions to that principle as irrelevant to the
present case, because the Channel Islands were not small and insig-
nificant islands, but, by reason of their special constitutional status,
effectively island States."' In light of this characterization, their
location off the French coast should be regarded as irrelevant to the
delimitation of their continental shelf. In regard to equitable con-
siderations, the navigational, security, and defense interests relied
on by France were, in the British view, of doubtful relevance and in
any case no less important to the United Kingdom. 45 The British
138. Id at 78, para. 150.
139. Id at 93, para. 195.
140. Id at 79-80, para. 156.
141. Id at 82, para. 164.
142. Id at 82-84, paras. 165-67.
143. Id at 84, para. 168.
144. Id. at 85, para. 171.
145. Id at 87, para. 175.
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strongly challenged the French interpretation of the concept of nat-
ural prolongation and emphasis on proportionality and argued that
the enclave solution was inconsistent with state practice. 146 Finally,
the United Kingdom declared that if an enclave solution was
adopted, a zone of twelve miles rather than six miles should be pre-
scribed, because a twelve-mile fishery zone had been previously es-
tablished in the region and at some future date the territorial sea
might be similarly extended. 147
The Court of Arbitration began its assessment of these argu-
ments by focusing on the central issue - the status of the Channel
Islands. It agreed with the British view that they could not be re-
garded as mere rocks, or small islands, with no relevance to delimi-
tation. 148 However, a close analysis of the islands' constitutional
status, in particular the United Kingdom's responsibility for the is-
lands' foreign affairs, led the Court to reject the British argument
that the islands should be regarded as territories distinct from the
United Kingdom.
[A]s between the United Kingdom and the French Republic, the
Court must treat the Channel Islands only as islands of the
United Kingdom, not as semi-independent States entitled in
their own right to their own continental shelf vis-/i-vis the French
Republic. The legal framework within which the Court must de-
cide the course of the boundary (or boundaries) in the Channel
Islands region is, therefore, that of two opposite States one of
which possesses island territories close to the coast of the other
State. 149
Having characterized the issue as one involving two States
rather than three, the Court briefly considered whether the Channel
Islands might be regarded as a projection or extension of the
United Kingdom mainland, an argument not presented by the
United Kingdom. The Court concluded that the argument was un-
tenable and observed that such an interpretation of the situation
"would be as extravagant legally as it manifestly is geographi-
cally." '
50
The Court next examined arguments concerning "natural pro-
longation." The Court agreed with the British contention that the
French argument had placed an inordinate emphasis on the geo-
146. Id. at 87, para. 177.
147. Id at 88, para. 179.
148. Id at 89, para. 184.
149. Id. at 90, paras. 186-87.
150. Id at 91, para. 190.
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graphical and geological aspects of the concept of natural prolonga-
tion.'" ' The Court emphasized it was the juridical significance of
the concept that required assessment and attempted to explain the
relationship between "natural features" and the applicable law,
particularly the relevance of natural prolongation to the framing of
an equitable delimitation.
In international law, as the United Kingdom emphasised in the
pleadings, the concept of the continental shelf is a juridical con-
cept which connotes the natural prolongation under the sea not
of a continent or geographical land mass but of the land territory
of each State. And the very fact that in international law the
continental shelf is a juridical concept means that its scope and
the conditions for its application are not determined exclusively
by the physical facts of geography but also by legal rules. More-
over, it is clear both from the insertion of the "special circum-
stances" provision in Article 6 and from the emphasis on
"equitable principles" in customary law that the force of the car-
dinal principle of "natural prolongation of territory" is not abso-
lute, but may be subject to qualification in particular
situations. 1
52
The Court's treatment of the natural prolongation issue had a
dual effect. It undercut the French argument that the Channel
Islands were a geographical anomaly located on the natural prolon-
gation of French territory and prevented the British from asserting
that the seabed between the Channel Islands and the median line
was a natural prolongation of their territory. The Court declared
that in the present kind of situation, natural prolongation was a
concept which, though not irrelevant to the Parties' legal rights, was
inadequate to define them.'53 The overriding objective of the
Court was to achieve an equitable delimitation and for that exercise
natural prolongation was a necessary, but not a sufficient, consider-
ation.
The true position, in the opinion of the Court, is that the princi-
ple of natural prolongation of territory is neither to be set aside
nor treated as absolute in a case where islands belonging to one
State are situated on continental shelf which would otherwise
constitute a natural prolongation of the territory of another
State. The application of that principle in such a case, as in other
cases concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf, has to
151. Id at 92, para. 191.
152. Id
153. Id. at 93, para. 194.
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be appreciated in the light of all the relevant geographical and
other circumstances. When the question is whether areas of con-
tinental shelf, which geologically may be considered a natural
prolongation of the territories of two States, appertain to one
State rather than to the other, the legal rules constituting the ju-
ridical concept of the continental shelf take over and determine
the question. Consequently, in these cases the effect to be given
to the principle of natural prolongation of the coastal State's
land territory is always dependent not only on the particular geo-
graphical and other circumstances but also on any relevant con-
siderations of law and equity.'
54
The Court next addressed the question of equality and propor-
tionality. France maintained that because the two States had ap-
proximately equal lengths of coasts, they should have
approximately equal areas of continental shelf.55 The French sub-
missions also went considerably beyond this and invoked the doc-
trine of the equality of States as a general justification for the mid-
Channel median line. 56 The Court viewed this latter argument as
misconceived. While the length of the respective coastlines was
highly relevant, the doctrine of the equality of States had no bear-
ing on a decision concerned with delimitation.
The doctrine of the equality of States, applied generally to the
delimitation of the continental shelf, would have vast implica-
tions for the division of the continental shelf among the States of
the world, implications which have been rejected by a majority
of States and which would involve, on a huge scale, that refash-
ioning of geography repudiated in the North Sea Continental
She/f cases. Any ground of equity, the Court considers, is rather
to be looked for in the particular circumstances of the present
case and in the particular equality of the two States in their geo-
graphical relation to the continental shelf of the Channel.
57
Among the relevant factors in achieving an equitable delimita-
tion in the Channel Islands region were the size and importance of
the islands and the limits of the Parties' coastal fisheries and territo-
rial seas.' 5 8 The navigational, security and defense interests of the
Parties were also relevant; however, as the Court explained, both
Parties had such interests and the English Channel was a major
route of international maritime navigation, therefore such evidence
154. Id.
155. Id at 83, para. 166.
156. Id at 93, para. 195.
157. Id
158. Id. at 90-91, para. 187.
28
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol10/iss2/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
was not regarded as decisive.' 59 The Court stated that navigational,
security, and defense interests must be treated as merely tending
"to evidence the predominant interest of the French Republic in
the southern areas of the English Channel, a predominance which
is also strongly indicated by its position as a riparian State along
the whole of the Channel's south coast."'
160
The decisive factor in the delimitation of the Channel Islands
region was the approximate equality of the States' mainland coast-
lines on either side of the Channel and the unequal division of the
continental shelf which would follow from an unmodified applica-
tion of the equidistance principle.
The Court considers that the primary element in the present
problem is the fact that the Channel Islands region forms part of
the English Channel, throughout the whole length of which the
Parties face each other as opposite States having almost equal
coastlines. The problem of the Channel Islands apart, the conti-
nental shelf boundary in the Channel indicated by both custom-
ary law and Article 6, as the Court has previously stated, is a
median line running from end to end of the Channel. The exist-
ence of the Channel Islands close to the French coast, #'permitted
to divert the course of that mid- Channel median line, effects a radi-
cal distortion of the boundary creative of inequity.
16 1
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made little reference to
State practice and for the most part discussed the issues in terms of
legal principle. In the course of argument, however, both Parties
referred to the problem of delimiting the continental shelf of the
French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon,'62 and in weighing the
equities in the Channel Islands region, the Court referred specifi-
cally to that controversy. 1
63
France argued that because St. Pierre and Miquelon are lo-
cated off the coast of Newfoundland, and France and Canada are
not opposite States, no comparison could be drawn with the Chan-
nel Islands.'" The suggestion t65 that France might agree with
Canada to renounce the equidistance principle in favor of an en-
159. Id at 91, para. 188.
160. Id.
161. Id at 94-95, para. 199 (emphasis added).
162. On the St. Pierre et Miquelon dispute, see Beauchamp, Crommelin & Thompson,
Jurisdictional Problems in Canada's Offshore, II ALBERTA L. REV. 431 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Canada's Offshore].
163. Judgment, supra note 5, at 87, para. 177.
164. Id. at 81, para. 159.
165. The Relkve des Conclusions setting out the terms of a possible settlement of the dis-
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clave solution was, however, also advanced as a precedent to sup-
port French proposals in the Channel Islands region. The United
Kingdom argued that the original French claim for a full and strict
application of the equidistance principle for St. Pierre and
Miquelon supported the British position on the Channel Islands.1
66
The British alleged that France considered renouncing this claim
only after Canada recognized special rights for the islands, which
France refused to concede in the Channel Islands region.
67
While the Court declined to examine the legal position of the
French islands in any detail, its comments indicated its general sup-
port for the French thesis.' 68 The case of the French islands was
treated as distinguishable, both on the ground that opposite States
were not involved and because the open waters to the east of St.
Pierre and Miquelon offered more scope for redressing inequities
than the English Channel.' 69 The Court acknowledged that the
proposed enclave solution had included special privileges for the
French islands, but here too the islands' location was significant
because "for these special privileges there is a counterpart in the
considerable extent of continental shelf left to Canada in the
Atlantic to seawards of the islands."'1
70
Because the Channel Islands were so close to the French coast,
the Court refused to consider cases in which islands with a different
relationship to the median line were given a full continental shelf.
The case is quite different from that of small islands on the right
side of or close to the median line, and it is also quite different
from the case where numerous islands stretch out one after an-
other long distances from the mainland. The precedents of semi-
enclaves, arising out of such cases, which are invoked by the
United Kingdom, do not, therefore, seem to the Court to be in
point. The Channel Islands are not only "on the wrong side" of the
mid-Channel median line but wholly detached geographically from
the United Kingdom. 171
Due to the inequitable consequences that would result from
giving the Channel Islands their full legal effect, the Court con-
pute was erroneously described by the Court as an agreement between France and Canada.
See McRae, supra note 66, at 190 n.60.
166. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 87-88, para. 177.
167. Id. at 88, para. 177.
168. Id. at 95, para. 200.
169. Id at 95, para. 200.
170. Id
171. Id at 95, para. 199 (emphasis added).
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cluded that it was necessary to adopt the French solution and de-
limit this section of the continental shelf by means of the median
line in the Channel.
172
The Court viewed the equitable considerations advanced by
the United Kingdom - the size and significance of the islands and
their close links with the United Kingdom - as relevant considera-
tions but held that they were not of sufficient importance to dis-
place the mid-Channel median line as the equitable solution.
173
Although the mid-Channel median line was the primary element in
the Court's solution, it gave limited recognition to the British
equitable considerations by designating that the continental shelf of
the Channel Islands be an enclave twelve miles in width, to be de-
limited from the established baselines of the territorial sea.'
74
VI. DELIMITING THE ATLANTIC REGION
In the Atlantic region, the Court had decided that the delimita-
tion was governed by the Geneva Convention and not, as France
had argued, by customary international law. 75 The Court also de-
cided that the equidistance - special circumstances principle con-
tained in Article 6 was essentially identical to the prescriptions of
customary international law in the North Sea Cases.176 Conse-
quently, the existence of special circumstances was dependent upon
the question of whether or not the median line provided an equita-
ble delimitation of the area.
France argued that there were indeed special circumstances
and sought to justify the use of another method of delimitation.
While France was prepared to argue that the British line was not a
true equidistance line, 7 7 the heart of the French case was the prop-
osition that use of the equidistance line in the disputed area would
have disproportionate consequences by exaggerating the signifi-
172. Id at 95, para. 201.
173. Id at 94, para. 198.
174. Id at 95-96, para. 202.
175. Id at 98, para. 205.
176. 1d at 98, para. 206.
177. The French argument here was that the British line was constructed by reference to
only two base-points, Bishop Rock in the Scillies and Pointe de Pern on Ushant. This as-
sumption and the inferences to be drawn from it were strongly disputed by the United King-
dom. Though the Court's Judgment does not deal with the issue expressly, its use of the
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cance of the Scilly Isles.' 7 8 This argument was supported by refer-
ence to observations by the ICJ in the North Sea Cases on the
analogous case of adjacent States;' 79 to the alleged lack of a British
Atlantic coast;'8 ° and to grounds for minimizing the significance of
small islands that had already been advanced in relation to the
Channel Islands. ' 8
France suggested that the Court adopt the bisector of the gen-
eral direction of the two coastlines and ignore both Ushant and the
Scilly Isles.'82 France found support for this method, which pro-
duced a more northerly line of demarcation, in the decisions of the
ICJ in the North Sea Cases and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
Case,183 as well as in a recent agreement between Spain and France
regarding delimitation in the Gulf of Gascony.
84
The British maintained that throughout the arbitration area,
France and the United Kingdom were opposite States, that Ushant
and the Scilly Isles were integral parts of their respective States
which could not be ignored, and that there were no special circum-
stances.' 85 The special circumstances concept, it was argued,
should be interpreted strictly with much more than a desire to re-
fashion nature needed to justify a departure from the equidistance
line.18 6 The French attempt to substitute the general direction of
the coastlines for their actual course was strongly criticized and the
North Sea Cases distinguished. 87 In conclusion, the United
Kingdom argued that if any parallel could be drawn with the North
Sea Cases, it should be recognized that the United Kingdom, with
France to the south and Ireland to the north, was in much the same
position as the Federal Republic of Germany and therefore de-
served equivalent treatment.' 88
As with its discussion of the Channel Islands region, the Court
prefaced its assessment of the rival contentions with a review of the
geographical features and other characteristics of the disputed area.
178. Judgment, supra note 5, at 102, para. 215.
179. Id. at 103, para. 218.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 99, para. 208.
183. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. 116.
184. See Judgment, supra note 5, at 104, para. 220.
185. Id. at 101, para. 212.
186. Id. at 107, para. 226.
187. Id. at 109, para. 230.
188. Id. at 109, para. 231.
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After noting that the coasts of the two States were similar - both
with peninsulas extended by offshore islands - the Court rejected
the French contention that the United Kingdom had no maritime
frontage on the region and held that the British Atlantic frontage
was broadly similar to that of France.' 89 However, in one impor-
tant respect the coasts were different: the United Kingdom main-
land and the Scilly Isles project a good deal farther into the
Atlantic than the French mainland and the island of Ushant. 90
The presence of other States with Atlantic coasts was another back-
ground element.' 9 ' While the Spanish coast was immaterial, the
Irish Republic was a factor of which the Court took cognizance.
192
The Court's investigation of whether the situation in the
Atlantic region was one of opposite or adjacent States is discussed
above.'93 Although inclined to characterize the situation as one of
opposite States under Article 6(1), the Court decided that whatever
the precise characterization, the crucial question was whether or
not there were special circumstances in the region that justified an
equitable departure from the median line.' 94
The question, the Court emphasized, was not simply the effect
of the Scilly Isles on the equidistance line, but whether in light of
the overall situation in the region, use of the equidistance line could
be regarded as inequitable. 1 Thus, while it was true that the west-
ward projection of the Scilly Isles had the effect of deflecting the
equidistance line southwest, this fact alone was not conclusive.
The mere fact . . . that the presence of the Scilly Isles in the
position in which they lie has that effect, does not in itself suffice
to justify a boundary other than an equidistance line delimited
by reference to the Scillies. The question is whether in the light of
all the pertinent geographical circumstances, that fact amounts to
an inequitable distortion of the equidistance line producing dispro-
189. Id at 110, para. 234.
190. Id. at 11, para. 235.
191. Id. at 110, para. 236.
192. It will be recalled, however, that when discussing the scope of its jurisdiction earlier
in the Judgment, the Court had both denied that inferences as to the course of the British-
Irish boundary could be drawn from its decision and held that its conclusions did not depend
on calculations of proportionality, to which Irish claims might be relevant. Id. at 31, para.
28.
193. Id at 111- 113, paras. 237-42.
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portionate effects on the areas of shelf accruing to the two
States. 196
The Court again emphasized it was not concerned with refash-
ioning nature or amending geography. 9 7 In the present situation,
however, the general similarity of the coasts of the two States raised
doubts regarding the suitability of the equidistance principle.
[Wihen account is taken of the fact that in other respects the two
States abut on the same continental shelf with coasts not mark-
edly different in extent and broadly similar in their relation to
that shelf, a question arises as to whether giving full effect to the
Scilly Isles in delimiting an equidistance boundary out to the
1000-metre isobath may not distort the boundary and have dis-
proportionate effects as between the two States.'
98
The Court concluded that the equidistance principle did have
inequitable effects and therefore special circumstances existed in
the Atlantic region. 1 The situation, as the Court saw it, was
analogous to one in which an equidistance line was unduly influ-
enced by a long promontory.
In the view of the Court, the further projection westwards of the
Scilly Isles, when superadded to the greater projection of the
Cornish mainland westwards beyond Finist~re, is much of the
same nature for present purposes, and has much the same ten-
dency to distortion of the equidistance line, as the projection of
an exceptionally long promontory, which is generally recognised
to be one of the potential forms of "special circumstance." In the
present instance, the Court considers that the additional projec-
tion of the Scilly Isles into the Atlantic region does constitute an
element of distortion which is material enough to justify the de-
limitation of a boundary other than the strict median line envis-
aged in Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention.
200
A special solution was required to achieve an equitable delimi-
tation, and the equidistance line would not do. The Court prefaced
its discussion of French proposals by stating that its decision must
be based on legal criteria and that it would neither apportion the
disputed area nor decide the case ex aequo et bono.2° I
France had argued that the Court's delimitation should be
196. Id. at 114, para. 243 (emphasis added).
197. Id at 114, para. 244.
198. Id
199. Id.
200. Id at 114, para. 244.
201. Id at 115, para. 245.
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based upon the general direction of the two States' coastlines.2 °2
The Court rejected the French solution, because it detached the
process of delimitation from the actual Atlantic coastlines and was
therefore difficult to reconcile with the concept of the continental
shelf as a natural prolongation of land territory.2 °3
The solution must, therefore, be related to the actual coasts
and this led back to the equidistance method, or at least a variant of
it.
[I]t seems to the Court to be in accord not only with the legal
rules governing the continental shelf but also with State practice
to seek the solution in a method modifying or varying the equi-
distance method rather than to have recourse to a wholly differ-
ent criterion of delimitation. The appropriate method, in the
opinion of the Court, is to take account of the Scilly Isles as part
of the coastline of the United Kingdom but to give them less
than their full effect in applying the equidistance method.2°4
Why, it may be asked, since the Court held that the Scilly Isles
were a special circumstance, did it take them into account at all?
Although the Isles' effect was to deflect the equidistance line in an
inequitable way, they were, like the French island of Ushant, an
integral part of the coast by reason of their political status, size,
population, and location.20 5 While their legal significance could be
modified, they could not be completely ignored.
Just as it is not the function of equity in the delimitation of the
continental shelf completely to refashion geography, so it is also
not the function of equity to create a situation of complete equity
where nature and geography have established an inequity. Eq-
uity does not, therefore, call for coasts, the relation of which to
the continental shelf is not equal, to be treated as having com-
pletely equal effects. What equity calls for is an appropriate
abatement of the disproportionate effects of a considerable pro-
jection onto the Atlantic continental shelf of a somewhat attenu-
ated portion of the coast of the United Kingdom.
20 6
The Court, in determining the appropriate abatement, refused
to invest the principle of proportionality with any special signifi-
cance. Considerations of proportionality produced the conclusion
that the Scilly Isles were to be considered a special circumstance;
202. Id at 115, para. 246.
203. Id
204. Id. at 116, para. 249.
205. Id at 116, para. 248.
206. Id at 116-17, para. 249.
Vol. 10
35
Merrills: The United Kingdom--France Continental Shelf Arbitration
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1980
CONTINENTAL SHELF ARBITRATION
there the significance of proportionality ended. State practice em-
ploys a variety of solutions to the problem of off-shore islands; the
Court selected the "half-effect" method as the appropriate solution
in this case.
The method of giving half-effect consists in delimiting the line
equidistant between the two coasts, first, without the use of the
offshore island as a base-point and, secondly, with its use as a
base-point; a boundary giving half-effect to the island is then the
line drawn mid-way between those two equidistance lines.
20 7
This method of delimitation was suitable because of two sig-
nificant facts: the Scilly Isles were approximately twice as far from
the mainland as Ushant, and the designated boundary followed the
slight southwesterly trend of the Parties' coastlines.208 Apart from a
small area in the Atlantic region, where the Court employed an
unmodified median line because the Parties were indisputably op-
posite States, the Court's delimitation in the Atlantic region utilized
the modified median line described above.
20 9
VII. THE DISPUTE REGARDING THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF
THE 1977 JUDGMENT
In accordance with customary practice, the Arbitration Agree-
ment provided for the possibility of further recourse to the Court in
the event of doubts regarding the interpretation of the Judgment.
Article 10(2) of the Arbitration Agreement provided that "either
Party may, within three months of the rendering of the Decision,
refer to the Court any dispute between the Parties as to the meaning
and scope of the Decision. '' 2 10 On October 17, 1977, the United
Kingdom invoked this provision and applied to the Court to correct
what it regarded as technical errors in the Judgment. The alleged
errors concerned the definitions of two parts of the boundary and
207. Id at 117, para. 251. The Court pointed out that the half-effect method had been
employed "in one instance, at least" in previous practice. Id Presumably this is a reference
to the 1965 agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia delimiting the continental shelf
around Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf. See Young, Equitable Solutions for Offshore
Boundaries. The 1968 SaudiArabia - Iran Agreement, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1970). That
agreement was never ratified and the matter was ultimately resolved in 1968 by a new treaty
providing for a revised line. Consequently, the United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf
Arbitration appears to be the first case of the actual use of the half-effect method.
208. Judgment, supra note 5, at 117, para. 251.
209. Id. at 119, para. 255. For criticism of the Court's application of the half-effect
method, see McRae, supra note 66, at 194-95.
210. Interpretation, supra note 5, at 134.
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the drawing of these parts on the Boundary-Line Chart, which
formed part of the 1977 Judgment. 2"
The boundaries in question were the arcs to the north and west
of the Channel Islands, where the Boundary-Line Chart and the
specification in the disposiqfof the Judgment failed to take account
of all the base-points from which the islands' territorial sea was
measured, and the delimitation in the Atlantic area, where the
United Kingdom maintained that the Boundary-Line Chart had
distorted the half-effect principle by failing to take into account the
curvature of the earth, thereby depicting the boundary as a straight,
instead of a curved, line.2 2
The Court delivered its Interpretation in March 1978, follow-
ing oral hearings in which France disputed the admissibility, as
well as the substance, of the British claim. 213 The 1978 Interpreta-
tion included an extended account of the Parties' arguments and
evidence; because the account consisted of a detailed review of cur-
rent techniques of marine cartography, no repetition is called for
here. However, argument was also directed to the meaning of the
1977 Judgment and the extent of the Court's powers to interpret it.
It is in these issues that the legal interest of the case is to be found.
The first French argument was that the United Kingdom ap-
plication to the Court was inadmissible, because it had been filed
after the three-month time limit of Article 10(2).214 The Court had
little difficulty in disposing of this objection. Although the initial
Judgment was dated June 30, 1977, it had not been communicated
to the Parties until July 18, 1977.215 Under these circumstances, the
Court unhesitatingly endorsed the British view that, for the pur-
poses of Article 10, the Judgment was rendered on July 18, 1977.2 16
A second French objection was that no dispute regarding "the
meaning and scope" of the 1977 Judgment had arisen within the
three-month period.217 The French argued that the diplomatic ex-
changes following the 1977 Judgment had concerned only its "pa-
ternity" - the value to be attached to the various parts of the
Judgment - where these were in apparent contradiction, and the
211. Id.
212. Id at 135.
213. See generally id. at 133-95.
214. Id at 151.
215. Id at 138, para. 3.
216. 1d at 152, para. 3.
217. Id at 153, para. 7.
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respective roles of the Court and its Expert.2" 8 Thus, the French
contended, it was only after the British application in October 1978,
and in later exchanges between the Parties, that a broader dispute
about the meaning and scope of the Judgment arose.
The Court gave two reasons for rejecting this objection. First,
the early diplomatic exchanges indicated that the paternity of the
Judgment was intimately linked with the dispute regarding the
Judgment's meaning and scope.219 Second, the Court cited the ob-
servations of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Chorzbw Factory Case,22 ° and held that "to require undue formal-
ity, such as the exhaustion of diplomatic negotiations, in establish-
ing the existence of a dispute would be out of place in the context of
a request for the interpretation of a judgment."22 ' The Court of
Arbitration added that this was an even more forceful considera-
tion in this case, where the right to request an interpretation was
subject to a comparatively short time limit.
222
The final and most substantial French objection declared that
the United Kingdom application requested a rectification or a mod-
ification, of the Judgment, not an interpretation; therefore, France
insisted, the British application was beyond the scope of Article
10(2).223 On this point, the Court held that the objection was not of
an "exclusively preliminary character. '224 As a result, the French
objection could be examined only within the framework of the mer-
its of the case, to which the Court then turned.
The Court first reviewed the delimitation of the Channel
Islands region. It began by considering the relationship between
the passages in the 1977 Judgment expressing its reasoning and the
corresponding provisions of the dispositf. The Court found that
the dispositf was no more than an application of the principles and
methods set out in the earlier passages. 225 The Court held that
these earlier passages contained points settled with binding force in
the Judgment, and could therefore be examined to determine the
meaning and scope of the dispost'f.
226
218. Id at 154, para. 8.
219. Id at 155, para. 11.
220. [19281 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 13.
221. Interpretation, supra note 5, at 155, para. 12.
222. Id
223. Id at 156, para. 14.
224. Id at 157, para. 16.
225. Id at 162, para. 30.
226. The Court added, however, that
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The Court concluded that the discrepancy alleged by the
United Kingdom did indeed exist. The failure in the disposi#/ to
make use of five low-tide elevations and two dry-land, low-water
features meant that in two places the line on the Boundary-Line
Chart encroached on the twelve-mile fishery limit of the Channel
Islands.227 Therefore the line could not be said to have been drawn
"from the established baselines of the territorial sea of the Channel
Islands," as the Court had previously specified in the 1977 Judg-
ment.228
The Court found that the existence of the above discrepancy
was not in dispute, because France did not dispute the base-points
relied on by the United Kingdom. 229 The Court then assessed the
legal significance of the discrepancy and concluded that since the
dispositi had manifestly failed to implement the Court's intention,
rectification on the grounds of material error was required.
The discrepancy between the dispositi and the Court's findings
in the reasoning arises purely and simply from technical causes
resulting in a mis-application of those findings, a discrepancy not
detected by the Court owing to the differences in character and
scale between the Boundary-Line Chart and the relevant charts
submitted during the proceedings in 1977. The discrepancy is
therefore one which is properly characterised as a "material er-
ror," analogous to one resulting from a "slip of the pen" or from
the miscalculation or miscasting of arithmetical figures. The
power of a court to rectify such a discrepancy where in the inter-
ests of good administration of justice it is necessary to correct a
material error that appears on the face of its decision, is consid-
ered by the Court of Arbitration to be generally accepted.230
The Court noted that while Article 10(2) provided the basis for
investigating the scope and meaning of the 1977 Judgment, the
Court also had an inherent power to rectify a material error re-
the "findings" incorporated in those paragraphs of the reasoning are themselves
conclusions drawn by the Court from its examination in previous paragraphs of the
considerations of fact and law held by it to be pertinent to the determination of the
course of the boundary in each region. Consequently, it is not only the reasoning of
the paragraphs embodying the findings invoked by the United Kingdom to which
reference has to be made in interpreting the relevant provisions of the dispositi/,
account may at the same time also have to be taken of the reasoning in other
paragraphs by process of which the Court arrived at those findings "essential" to its
decision in the dispositif .
1d at 162, para. 30.
227. Id at 164, para. 35.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 163-64, paras. 33-34.
230. Id at 165, para. 36.
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vealed by such an investigation. 23' Because this power did not
need to be expressly provided for in the Arbitration Agreement, it
could be exercised in the present case. Accordingly, the Court de-
cided that the erroneous section of the dispositf should be corrected
to include the omitted base-points and that the Parties themselves
should make the appropriate correction to the relevant portion of
the Boundary-Line Chart.23 2
In the Atlantic region, the problem was more complex. Con-
fronted with a mass of technical evidence regarding contemporary
practice on the delimitation of marine boundaries, the Court had
one intricate issue to resolve: whether or not the Expert's imple-
mentation of the Court's 1977 Judgment by means of a straight-line
boundary (loxodrome) on a Mercator chart was compatible with
the method of delimitation the Court had prescribed?
The British argument that it was incompatible was based on
the fact that the Court's solution to the problem of delimitation in
the Atlantic region - the half-effect method - was a modification
of the equidistance principle, and that any demarcation based on
that principle which failed to allow for the curvature of the earth so
distorted the boundary as to contradict its whole rationale.233 The
United Kingdom explained that the straight-line boundary in the
present case met the 1,000-meter isobath at a point approximately
four nautical miles to the north of the point where a true boundary,
corrected for scale error, would do so. 234 This was a significant dis-
crepancy, which the extension of the continental shelf to 200 miles
or to the edge of the continental margin would magnify.
The Court decided that the success of the British argument for
modifying the delimitation hinged on two propositions. The first
proposition was that the half-effect boundary had been envisaged
by the Court as the bisector of two lines each of which must be
truly equidistant from the selected base-points - that is, that the
equidistance principle lay at the root of the Court's decision and
that the half-effect method was nothing more than a variant, en-
tirely dependent on proper calculations of equidistance. 35 The
Court accepted this proposition, holding that it was clear from the
language of the Judgment that the foundation of the half-effect
231. Id.
232. Id at 166, para. 37.
233. Id at 166-68, paras. 38-41.
234. Id at 167, para. 40.
235. Id. at 189-90, para. 101.
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method was the equidistance principle.236
The second proposition was more difficult: that the lines speci-
fied in the Expert's technical report, from which the half-effect line
had been calculated, were not "either geographically or legally"
true equidistance lines, because no correction for scale error had
been made.237
The Court noted that in practice the application of the equidis-
tance principle was often simplified by the use of a limited number
of base-points.238 Moreover, it was quite common to plot equidis-
tance lines on Mercator charts without correction for scale error.239
However, the Atlantic region boundary was not a simplified equi-
distance line and the United Kingdom had demonstrated that the
need for long boundary lines to accommodate recent claims to ex-
tended maritime jurisdiction had produced a trend in state practice
towards the correction of scale error in demarcation.24°
In a key passage, the Court explained that the half-effect solu-
tion had been devised within a simplified frame of reference. It
regarded the crucial issue in the case as the compatibility of the
disputed line with this frame of reference.
[T]he half-effect solution was adopted by the Court as an equit-
able variant of the equidistance principle expressing a necessar-
ily approximate appreciation of diverse considerations; and...
the method for implementing it was devised as a modified rather
than a strict application of the equidistance method. This
method . . . was selected ad hoc, after a study of various pos-
sibilities and of several factors considered by it to be pertinent.
The ad hoc character of the device and the fact that it is a special
application of the equidistance method is, indeed, evidenced by
the Court's selection of two particular pairs of base-points for the
calculation of the lines determining the half-effect boundary
rather than all the potentially relevant points on the respective
coastlines. The question for decision, therefore, is whether the Ex-
pert's construction of the course of the boundary by reference to the
two loxodromes, correctly calculated on Mercator projection from
the specified base-points is compatible with the simplifiedframe for
applying the half-effect solution which has just been described- or
whether his omission to allowfor the scale of error inherent in that
236. Id at 189, para. 102.
237. Id at 188-89, para. 101.
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projection renders it incompatible with this frame. 241
The Court examined state practice, which indicated that de-
spite an emerging contrary trend, delimitation without correction
for scale error was not yet obsolete.2 42 The Court concluded that
the United Kingdom had failed to demonstrate that delimitation
without correction for scale error was "either inadmissible in law
or . ..so outmoded in practice as to make its use open . . . to
challenge. 243
The Court added that since the disputed boundary had been
arrived at after an extensive review of a variety of pertinent factors
and considerations, to reopen the issue and decide upon a new
boundary line would require a fresh examination of the situation.
This fresh examination would go beyond both the interpretation
function conferred upon the Court by Article 10(2) and the Court's
inherent power to rectify a material error. 2 "
The Court concluded that in the Atlantic region, the United
Kingdom had failed to establish that the course of the line defined
in the dispositif and shown on the Boundary-Line Chart was in
such contradiction with the earlier findings of the Court as to be
incompatible with the prescribed method of delimitation.245  Ac-
cordingly, the British request for the rectification of this segment of
the boundary was rejected.246
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION
The ICJ's decision in the North Sea Cases has been the subject
of extensive commentary and analysis.2 47  The Court of Arbitra-
241. Id at 192-93, para. 110 (emphasis added).
242. Id at 191, para. 105.
243. Id at 193, para. I11.
244. Id at 193, para. 112.
245. Id at 193-94, para. 113.
246. Id In its rulings on the admissibility of the claim and the rectification of the bound-
ary in the Channel Islands area, the Court was unanimous. However, in relation to the
Atlantic region it reached its decision by a majority of four-to-one. The dissenter, Judge
Briggs, expressed his support for the British position. Id at 202-03 (Briggs, J., dissenting).
The Court's ruling on the Atlantic region was also the subject of a short separate opinion in
which Judge Waldock explained that his concurrence was based on his view of the Court's
powers under Article 10(2), rather than the substantive merits of the British claim on which
he agreed with Judge Briggs. Id at 197-201 (Waldock, J., separate opinions).
247. See generally Grisel, The Lateral Boundaries of the Continental She(f and the Judg-
ment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Sheff Cases, 64 AM. J.
INT'L L. 562 (1970); Jennings, The Limits of Continental Shelf Jurisdiction.- Some Possible
Implications of the North Sea Case Judgment, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 819 (1969); Nordquist,
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tion's decisions in the United Kingdom - France Continental
Shelf Arbitration seem likely to provoke a similar response.
24 8
A common reaction to the 1978 Interpretation is surprise that
these further proceedings were necessary. While the United
Kingdom was justified in seeking a clarification of the original
Judgment, the enormous expenditure of time and effort which this
involved should never have been necessary. In the Channel Islands
region, the original Judgment's failure to utilize base-points which
were not only required by the Judgment, but actually before the
Court on maps forming part of the British case, was inexcusable.
In the Atlantic region, although the issue was less clear cut, it is
astonishing that when the Court's Expert calculated the boundary-
line "the Court did not appreciate that the boundary-line he de-
picted .. .was a loxodrome which, over its course of about 170
nautical miles, disregarded the sphericity of the earth, instead of a
geodesic conforming to the earth's curvature.
249
The Court's correction of the Channel Islands delimitation was
obviously justified and its reasoning, though a useful addition to
the sparse jurisprudence on the issue of material error,250 is un-
likely to be controversial. That the Atlantic region delimitation
presented a more debatable issue is indicated by the disagreement
within the Court.25' Without access to the record of the Parties'
pleadings, it will be difficult for critics to express a view on this
aspect of the case. On the basis of accessible evidence, however,
many may be inclined to agree with Judge Waldock 25 2 that the ad-
missibility of the British claim should have been regarded as the
key issue.253
The Legal Status ofArticles 1-3 of the Continental Shelf Convention According to the North
Sea Cases, I CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 60 (1970); notes 262, 270, 286 & 295 iMfra.
248. Commentaries to date include: Blecher, Equitable Delimitaton of Continental Shelf
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1979); Bowett, supra note 66; Brown, The Anglo-French Continental
Shelf Case, 33 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 304 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brown Article]; Brown, The
Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 461 (1979); Colson, The
UnitedKingdom-France Continental Shef Arbitration, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1978); McRae,
supra note 66.
249. Interpretation, supra note 5, at 202 (Briggs, J., dissenting opinion).
250. See W. REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 186-92 (1971); J. SIMPSON & H. Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 241-42 (1959).
251. See note 246 supra.
252. Id
253. See Judge Waldock's statement in Interpretation, supra note 5, at 197-201. On the
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Thus, there is much in the 1978 Interpretation of substantive
and procedural interest. However, it is the original Judgment that
will attract the most intense attention, and here the international
lawyer is presented with an almost embarrassing abundance of ma-
terial.
The Court's discussion of the significance of the Geneva Con-
vention is clearly a constructive contribution to a notoriously diffi-
cult aspect of the law of treaties. Reservations to multilateral
treaties are now generally permitted in the interests of encouraging
participation; therefore, the status and effect of reservations raise
theoretical issues of great practical importance. These questions
are fully explored in the discussion of the French and British posi-
tions on Article 6,254 where the Court's reasoning sheds light on
Article 21 of the Vienna Convention, as well as on customary inter-
national law. 55
The Court's review of this aspect of the case is, however, much
more than a contribution to the law of treaties. Over fifty States are
currently parties to the Geneva Convention, several with reserva-
tions or with comments on the reservations of other parties.256 Not
surprisingly, where questions of delimitation between parties to the
Convention are still unresolved, as in the case of Canada, France,
and the United States,257 the legal effect of such acts may be a criti-
cal issue. While the Court's treatment of the legal relations be-
tween France and the United Kingdom was necessarily based on
their particular responses to the Convention, the way in which the
Court approached that issue is bound to be seen as directly relevant
elsewhere.
Substantively, the Court's identification of the provisions of
the Geneva Convention with customary international law is a step
of major significance. In the North Sea Cases, the ICJ avoided the
254. See generally Judgment, supra note 5, at 32-50, paras. 33-74.
255. Bowett, supra note 66, at 67.
256. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 26.
257. Seegenerally Canada's Offshore, supra note 162; B. JOHNSON & M. ZACHER, CANA-
DIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 37-43 (1977). Canada has reserved its
position on, or declared unacceptable, the French declarations and reservations relating to
Articles 1, 2(4), 4, 5(1), 6(l), and 6(2). With respect to Article 1, Canada has declared that
"in the view of the Canadian Government the presence of an accidental feature such as a
depression or a channel in a submerged area should not be regarded as constituting an inter-
ruption in the natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal state into and under
the sea. Id. at 40. The United States has declared the Canadian declaration to be unaccept-
able. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 30, at 542.
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Convention by basing its decision on customary law.258 The ICJ's
avoidance of the Convention could be argued to have implied that
the equidistance-special circumstances rule was not guaranteed to
achieve a delimitation in accordance with equitable principles.
259
The Court of Arbitration has repudiated this view in favor of the
opinion of Judge Ammoun and others, that the relationship be-
tween equidistance and special circumstances is not subordination
but symbiosis.26°
Whether this conclusion is correct is as much a question of
principle as one of practice. The individual opinions in the North
Sea Cases suggest that whether equity is regarded as relevant to
delimitation depends on whether international law is perceived as a
normative or a policy-oriented system.26 Influenced no doubt by
the predilection for equitable principles so evident at recent ses-
sions of UNCLOS III, the Court of Arbitration has made its choice.
Those who are of the opinion that clear and relatively mechanical
principles of delimitation provide a better way of avoiding disputes
will perhaps remain unconvinced.262
One thing is clear - if the equitable approach is to be univer-
sal, it must be workable. This means that guidance as to its mean-
ing and application must be provided - a consideration which
derives added significance from the fact that equitable principles
form the basis of the delimitation provisions for the continental
shelf and the exclusive economic zone under discussion at
UNCLOS 111.263 In addition, the relevant provisions of the Re-
258. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (19691 I.C.J. 3, 42-46.
259. This is particularly apparent in those dissenting opinions which interpret Article 6
as laying down equidistance as the primary principle of delimitation and "special circum-
stances" as a qualification designed to cater to exceptional situations. North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 161-63 (Koretsky, V.P., dissenting); id at 184-87 (Tanaka, J.,
dissenting); id at 238-40 (Lachs, J., dissenting).
260. Id at 141-52 (Ammoun, J., separate opinion); see also id at 87-89 (Nervo, J., sepa-
rate opinion).
261. Merrills, Images and Models in the World Court: The Individual Opinions in the
North Sea Continental Shef Cases, 41 MODERN L. REV. 638 (1978).
262. See Brown Article, supra note 248, at 308-14. For criticism of the North Sea Cases
on this ground, see Brown, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 23 CURRENT LEGAL
PROB. 187 (1970); Foighel, The North Sea Continental Shef Case, 39 NORDISK TID. INT'L
RET. 109 (1969).
263. See Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor And the
Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970); VIII OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE
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vised Informal Composite Negotiating Text were regarded by the
Court of Arbitration as virtually identical to its own approach.264
In the North Sea Cases, the ICJ drew a sharp distinction be-
tween delimitation and apportionment of the continental shelf.
26 5
The Court of Arbitration reemphasized that point in its Judg-
ment.266 Though the distinction between delimitation according to
equitable principles and apportionment may not be obvious, its im-
portance is considerable. The main difficulty with the equitable ap-
proach to delimitation is its inherent uncertainty. Judicial
decisions, like the Judgment of the Court of Arbitration in the pres-
ent case, can help remove the uncertainty by providing examples of
the application of the equitable approach to particular situations.
International adjudication only occurs occasionally, however, and
such decisions will be infrequent. As a consequence, general indi-
cations of the outer limits of the equitable approach are at least as
important as specific examples of its use. The importance of the
distinction between delimitation and apportionment is its contribu-
tion to this "equitable frame of reference." Distinguishing delimi-
tation from apportionment helps keep the issues manageable by
enabling some broad discriminations to be made between relevant,
partially relevant, and wholly irrelevant considerations. Moreover,
as the Court of Arbitration noted, differentiating a decision based
on broad but recognizably legal criteria from a decision ex aequo et
bono has the salutary effect of elucidating the arbitral role of the
tribunal.
2 67
The renunciation by the ICJ and the Court of Arbitration of
any pretentions to "refashion nature ' '26s contributes to the equita-
264. See Colson, supra note 248, at 111. It is of particular interest in this connection that
the International Court of Justice has recently been asked to decide:
What are the principles and rules of international law which may be applied
for the delimitation of the area of the continental shelf appertaining to the Republic
of Tunisia and the area of continental shelf appertaining to the Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and, in rendering its decision, to take account of equitable
principles and the relevant circumstances which characterize the area, as well as the
recent trends admitted at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Special Agreement between the Republic of Tunisia and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, for the Submission of the Question of the Continental Shelf between the Two
Countries to the International Court of Justice, notified to the Court, December I. 1978, re-
printed in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 51 (1979).
265. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 22-24.
266. See notes 175-209 supra, and accompanying text.
267. Judgment, supra note 5, at 115, para. 245.
268. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 50; Judgment, supra note 5,
at 115, para. 246.
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ble frame of reference in a similar way. By emphasizing that the
tribunal's starting point must be the situation as it exists, this self-
denying ordinance circumscribes in an imprecise, but immediate
way, the argument as to whether the equidistance line should be
modified in any particular case.
In rejecting the notion of apportionment, the ICJ in the North
Sea Cases emphasized the continental shelf as the natural prolon-
gation of a State's land territory. 269 The vagueness of the ICJ's
comments on this issue soon attracted criticism. 27" The Court of
Arbitration, to its merit, gave assiduous attention to this concept. 271
In light of the Court's comments and discussion of the related is-
sues of proximity 27 2 and proportionality, 273 the significance of natu-
ral prolongation can now be appreciated. Such geological
considerations, far from defining the Parties' legal rights, do no
more than provide the setting for the application of equitable prin-
ciples.
The Court's treatment of the issue of natural prolongation 274 is
typical of its generally pragmatic approach to delimitation. An-
other useful clarification of the North Sea Cases Judgment is found
in the Court of Arbitration's discussion of the distinction between
opposite and adjacent States. 275 The British attempt to attach criti-
cal significance to the characterization of the situation in the Atlan-
tic region must be regarded as a sterile piece of legal conceptualism.
There can be little doubt that by emphasizing the geographical
rather than the legal relationship of the Parties in the region,276 the
Court interpreted the comments of its predecessor correctly and
perceived the true relationship between the delimitation provisions
of the Geneva Convention.277
The Court's treatment of the French attempt to capitalize on
the general direction of the Parties' coastlines is another helpful
clarification. The Federal Republic of Germany's reliance on the
concept of the "coastal front" in the North Sea Cases raised a simi-
269. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3, 22-23.
270. See Friedman, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases- A Critique, 64 AM. J. INT'L
L. 229 (1970); note 262 supra.
271. Judgment, supra note 5, at 115, para. 246.
272. Id at 52-53, paras. 80-81.
273. Id. at 60-61, paras. 98-101.
274. Id at 52, para. 79.
275. Id at 55-60, paras. 87-98.
276. Id at 113, para. 242.
277. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 26.
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lar issue.27 8 While the ICJ rejected the German submissions on this
point, 279 its Judgment could be regarded as broadly sympathetic to
their underlying rationale.2"' The Court of Arbitration's apprcach
to the French argument is essentially the same. The French con-
cept of the general direction of the coast, like the German concept
of the coastal front,28' is rejected as a criterion of delimitation, be-
cause it dissociates delimitation from the course of the actual coast-
lines.282 However, as in the North Sea Cases, the general direction
of the coast is, together with other elements, held to be relevant to
equitable delimitation.283 Thus, what is rejected is not the concept
of the general direction of the coast, but the attempt to invest the
concept with a more specific and perhaps a more conclusive signifi-
cance than its importance justifies.
Criticism of the Court's application of the half-effect method
of delimitation to the Scilly Isles has been discussed above.28 4 The
Court's treatment of the Channel Islands has recently provoked the
comment that, while the finding that the islands were a factor creat-
ing inequity is unlikely to be controversial,
it seems difficult to regard as other than the creation of a differ-
ent inequity, a decision which adopts a median line, unmodified
to compensate the United Kingdom for its virtual loss of all the
continental shelf around the islands, and at the same time pur-
ports to reflect equitable considerations invoked by the United
Kingdom by awarding the islands an area of continental shelf
which the United Kingdom could have secured, independently
of the arbitration, by claiming the same breadth of territorial sea
as has been claimed by France since 197 1.28
5
The Court's detailed treatment of the islands issue is, neverthe-
less, a specific application of equitable principles which will have
278. Germany argued that instead of being determined by the shape of its coast, each
State's continental shelf should be calculated by reference to the general direction of the
coasts of all the States concerned. In the German situation, it was argued, the general direc-
tion of the coasts in question lay northeast-southwest. Hence the coastal front was a straight
line with this orientation linking the extremities of the German coast and effectively neutral-
izing the concavity of the actual coast. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3,
22.
279. Id. at 23.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 22.
282. Judgment, supra note 5, at 115, para. 246.
283. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 53.
284. See note 209 supra.
285. Brown Article, supra note 248, at 324-25. See also Brown, supra note 248, at 514-1-8.
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repercussions. 286  Islands were not an issue in the North Sea
Cases.2 87 Consequently, much of the Judgment of the Court of Ar-
bitration concerns the inference to be drawn from the earlier cases.
Discussions of the legal significance of islands, whether in argu-
ment before legal tribunals or in diplomatic negotiations, will now
begin by examining the reasoning of the Court of Arbitration.
It should be noted, however, that the latest Judgment will be a
starting point, but no more. The Court's confirmation of the legal
insignificance of rocks and islets288 is useful, and the ruling may
have a direct and practical significance to islands such as the Sen-
kaku Islands.289 However, as the Court clearly stated, the kinds of
problems presented by the case were far from exhaustive; several
current disputes feature situations for which the Court's decision
provides no direct guidance. In the Aegean, 290 for example, the nu-
merous Greek islands scattered off the coast of Turkey can scarcely
be compared with the small and tightly grouped Channel Islands
archipelago, and the location of the Paracel and Spratly Islands in
the middle of the South China Sea poses a still different problem.
29'
Similarly, while the Court's comments on St. Pierre and
286. On the significance of islands in continental shelf delimitation, see Delin, Shall Is-
lands Be Taken Into Account When Drawing the Median Line According to Art. 6 ofthe Con-
vention on the Continental Shel/r 41 NORDISK TID. INT'L RET. 205; Ely, Seabed Boundaries
Between Coastal States.- The Effect to be Given Islets as "Special Circumstances, " 6 INT'L L.
219 (1972); Goldie, The International Court ofJustice's "Natural Prolongation'" and the Conti-
nental She/fProblem ofslands, 4 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 237 (1973); Karl, Islands and
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf A Framework/or Analysis, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 642
(1977).
287. Despite the fact that islands lay off the coasts of all three States, islands were not an
issue. For discussion of their potential significance, see Goldie, supra note 286, at 245; Karl,
supra note 286, at 647 n.22.
288. On the problem of characterizing such islands, see Blecher, supra note 248, at 77.
289. See Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and
the Law oTerritorialAcquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 221 (1974); Li, China and Off-Shore Oil:
The Tiao-yu Tai Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 143 (1975); Note, International Law and
the Sino-Japanese Controversy Over Territorial Sovereignty ofthe Senkaku Islands, 52 B.U.L.
REV. 763 (1972); Note, The Senkaku Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 664 (1973); note 293
infra.
290. On the Aegean Sea dispute, see Gross, The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Con-
cerning the Continental Shelfin the Aegean, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1977); Merrills, Oil Explo-
ration in the Aegean, 93 L.Q. REV. 29 (1977); Phylactopoulos, Mediterranean Discord-
Conflicting Greek-Turkish Claims in the Aegean Seabed, 8 INT'L L. 431 (1974). After refusing
a request by Greece for interim measures of protection, the ICJ has recently held that it lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, [1978] I.C.J.
3.
291. See Park, The South China Sea Disputes.- W'ho Owns the Islands and the Natural
Resources?, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 27 (1978).
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Miquelon292 will be closely studied in Ottowa and Paris, the Court
explicitly states that those islands present yet another special case.
Where parallels can be drawn, a degree of caution is still re-
quired. In the East China Sea, the situation of the Ryukyu
Islands293 off the southern tip of Japan invites comparison with the
Scilly Isles, and in the Gulf of Thailand,294 several offshore islands
bear more than a passing resemblence to the Channel Islands
group. It would, however, be quite inconsistent with the Court's
approach to press these parallels very far. The whole thrust of the
Judgment is that an equitable delimitation can be achieved only by
taking into account the situation in the disputed area in its entirety,
and by paying special attention to its unique features. Therefore,
while it is legitimate, and indeed essential, to characterize situations
by reference to their similarities or differences, it must also be rec-
ognized that an equitable delimitation in any given case will ulti-
mately depend upon its own peculiar features.
Similar considerations apply to the interpretation of the
Court's treatment of breaks in the surface of the continental
shelf.295 The Court's discussion of the significance of the Hurd
Deep and Hurd Deep Fault Zone, 29 6 and its comments on the
Norwegian Trough,297 are certainly helpful. It cannot be assumed,
however, that as a result of the Court's decision, all such features
can now be disregarded. In the delimitation of the Gulf of
Maine298 or the East China Sea,299 such features may be relevant.
292. Judgment, supra note 5, at 95, para. 200.
293. See Allen & Mitchell, The Legal Status of the Continental Shelf of the East China
Sea, 51 OREGON L. REV. 789 (1972); Park, Oil Under Troubled Waters.- The Northeast Asia
Sea-Bed Controversy, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 212 (1973); Park, The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea
Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J.
27 (1975).
294. See Ely & Pietrowski, Boundaries of Sea-Bed Jurisdiction Off the Pacific Coast of
Asia, 8 NAT. RESOURCES L. 611 (1975).
295. On the significance of such breaks in continental shelf delimitation, see Note, Delim-
itation of Continental Shef Jurisdiction Between States. The Effect of Physical Irregularities in
the Natural Continental Shef, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 77 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Delimitation].
296. Judgment, supra note 5, at 61-64, paras. 104-10.
297. Id. at 62-63, para. 107.
298. See Delimitation, supra note 295, at 89-96; Swan, The Guf of Maine Dispute: Canada
and the United States Delimit the Atlantic Continental Shelf, 10 NAT. RESOURCES L. 405
(1977). The Canadian declaration is set out in note 257 supra. On March 29, 1979, Canada
and the United States signed an agreement to submit the Gulf of Maine dispute either to the
ICJ or to arbitration. See Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 476, 478 (1979).
299. See Delimitation, supra note 295, at 96-104; note 293 supra.
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Everything depends on the circumstances. In some situations, the
dimensions or geological significance of a trench may raise the is-
sue of natural prolongation. In other situations, the emphasis in the
North Sea Cases on maintaining the unity of deposits300 may make
it possible to argue that delimitation along the axis of a trench is no
less equitable than the half-effect method or some other variant of
the median line.
However much the Court of Arbitration Judgment has left
open,30 1 there is much that it has clarified. Moreover, the decision,
as interpreted by the Court in 1978, settled the dispute. In a period
when the limitations of international courts and tribunals are often
more conspicuous than their achievements, the United Kingdom -
France Continental Shelf Arbitration is both a constructive contri-
bution to the law of the sea and a timely reminder of the continuing
value of international adjudication.
300. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 52.
301. Blecher is particularly critical of what he sees as the Court's lack of precision. See
Blecher, supra note 248.
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